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 “Two kinds of intellectual activity, both equally instinctive, have played a prominent 
part in the progress of physical science,” Jean Perrin wrote at the opening of his Les Atomes 
(1913).1 The tradition of induction is represented by Galileo and Carnot, who were capable of 
establishing physical laws through the direct observations and generalizations of experience. 
The inquiries guided by intuition include the works of Dalton and Boltzmann, which inspect 
the “hidden gears” of the empirical world and seek to “explain the complications of the visible 
in terms of invisible simplicity.”2 The temporary success of one method, as Perrin opined, 
cannot deny the necessity of the other. Furthermore, he envisaged the day when the two 
approaches would merge into one—a time when individual atoms would be as visible as mi-
croorganisms.  
Les Atomes, viewed by many as the manifesto for the reality of atomic hypothesis, was 
published at a critical point in the history of modern science: since the turn of the century, 
the crises of classical physics and the discoveries related to particles and radiation had pro-
voked a serious quest for the mysteries of the atomic world, but the revolutionary theory, 
later known as quantum mechanics, would not be established in another decade. In modern 
vocabulary, Perrin’s dichotomy between the “inductive” and “intuitive” inquiries can be re-
phrased as the classification of physics research according to the scale of the physical objects 
being studied. Subfields like classical mechanics and thermodynamics are thus distinct from 
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microphysics, which involves the study of atoms, molecules, and elementary particles. How-
ever, few physicists of the following generations would fully accept Perrin’s criterion—
visibility—as the most sensible standard to distinguish macroscopic phenomena from micro-
scopic ones. In fact, given the progress of modern physics since the quantum revolution, one 
might find this borderline increasingly hard to draw. 
This essay traces the conceptual history of micro- and macroscopicity in the context of 
physical science. By focusing on three distinct episodes spanning five centuries, we show the 
scientific and philosophical meanings of this antonym pair, despite never being far from “the 
small” and “the large,” have been evolving as the frontier of science advances. We analyze 
the intellectual and material impetus for these movements, and conclude that this conceptual 
history reflects the changing interaction between the natural world and humankind.  
 
I.  17th Century: Visibility to the Unassisted Eye 
Anthony Leggett remarked in The Problems of Physics (1987): 
To the twentieth-century scientist and the twentieth-century layman alike, few things 
seem more natural or self-evident than the idea that the way to understand the prop-
erties and behaviour of a complex object is to take it apart into its constituent 
elements.3 
It would not be easy for modern minds to imagine a time when the study of the basic entities 
of matter was not only absent in scientific practice, but as some schools of thought claimed, 
should even be excluded from rational thinking. In Renaissance natural philosophy, “quali-
ties”—the Aristotelian term for the causes of properties and natural effects—is divided into 
the “manifest” and the “occult,” depending on whether they are perceptible to human senses.4 
“Manifest” properties include color, motion, weight, etc., whereas magnetism, chemistry, and 
medicine are all “occult” because they could only be perceived through their effects but not 
their mechanisms. Aristotelianism emphasizes the completeness of sensation and therefore 
regards the “occult qualities,” which appeared to be insensible and unexplainable, as inap-
propriate topics for rational philosophy. “We perceive the Actions but not the qualities 
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whereby they are affected,”—the quote from Daniel Sennert shows the prevailing impedi-
ment to modern science in the early 17th century.5 
 Such a doctrine was challenged during the Scientific Revolution. As René Descartes 
asserted, mechanical explanations will be found for all “occult qualities,” which are therefore 
within the scope of scientific reasoning.6 Moreover, he believed all perceptible effects are es-
sentially generated by those hidden mechanisms. Meanwhile, pioneers of experimentation 
demonstrated that human senses can be extended through the assistance of scientific instru-
ments. A remarkable example is the microscope, which had a major impact on both academic 
research and popular culture. In the Preface to his Micrographia (1665)—the first treatise on 
optical microscopy, Robert Hooke described instruments as “artificial organs” remedying the 
infirmities of “the Senses,” and thus rectifying the operations of “the Memory, the Judgement, 
and the Reason.”7 Some contemporaries accepted this tool with even greater passion. For 
instance, after looking through Cornelis Drebbel’s microscope, the exhilarated Constantijn 
Huygens called the view through its lenses “a new theater of nature, another world”—a world 
worth meticulous observations and illustrations.8 
 Although its direct contribution to the knowledge of basic physics was not yet signifi-
cant, the infant microscope marked the arrival of an age when miniature structures, 
previously invisible, could form an extended vision for the sake of scientific observation and 
experimentation. Those objects that are obscure to the unassisted eye but visible with optical 
equipment comprise the early modern conception of the “microscopic world.” 
 
II.  Fin de siècle:  The Struggle of Atomic Hypothesis 
Owing to the fast diffusion of the microscope as a gadget for research and leisure, by 
the late 17th century, its magnified image was deprived of the privilege of being a “new world” 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Catherine Wilson, “Visual Surface and Visual Symbol: The Microscope and the Occult in Early Modern Sci-
ence,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 1988, 49:85–108. 
7 Robert Hooke, Micrographia: or Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies Made by Magnifying 
Glasses. With Observations and Inquiries Thereupon (London: The Royal Society, 1665), Preface. 
8 Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 
1983), pp. 6–7. Constantijn Huygens is a poet, diplomat, scholar, composer, and architect living in the Dutch 
Golden Age. He is the father of the prominent scientist Christiaan Huygens. 
  4 
but absorbed into human’s natural sensation. In the meantime, the early modern period wit-
nessed the renaissance of the ancient atomism—the belief that all matter is composed of 
undividable fundamental entities. Notably, Descartes, Boyle, and Newton all employed the 
model of “corpuscles” to explain astronomical motion, chemical reactions, and light, respec-
tively.9 The early modern corpuscularianism is nevertheless attached to little experimental 
foundation. The reality of microscopic particles was eventually to be revealed thanks to the 
advances of two branches of physics in the second half of the 19th centuries: In statistical 
mechanics, the concepts of atoms and molecules were used to derive the thermodynamic 
quantities of a system from its probable microscopic configurations.10 Meanwhile, charged 
particles—electrons and ions—were conceived to explain the newly discovered electromag-
netic phenomena, e.g. the Hall effect, the Kerr magneto-optic effect, and the Zeeman effect.11 
However, without direct experimental evidence, the true existence of these particles beyond 
a convenient hypothesis remained a matter of belief. For example, Ernst Mach, a firm posi-
tivist, would question whoever spoke to him of atoms: “Have you seen one?”12 
Hardly could one reply with a definite “yes” before Perrin’s systematic study of the 
Brownian motion and reliable measurements of the Avogadro number in 1907–1909. 13  
Around the same decade, various charged particles were observed and measured in cathode 
rays, cloud chambers, and falling drops, where particles are isolated from the bulk.14  These 
findings preluded the profoundest reformation of the scientific knowledge of the material 
world in modern history, where things are “not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer 
than we can suppose.”15 Then came the prominence of reductionism in the practice of science: 
a complex phenomenon should be understood from the properties and configurations of its 
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components. What was exactly opposite to the dominant philosophy before the Scientific Rev-
olution almost became the new doctrine in the 20th century. All these transformations were 
initiated by the success of atomic physics. 
Considering these backgrounds, especially the struggle to validate atomic reality 
among fin-de-siècle physicists and chemists, Perrin’s criterion for differentiating between 
macro- and microphysics seems fairly reasonable. But unlike its meaning at the time of Huy-
gens and Hooke, the “visibility” of scientific atomists does not refer to the resolution of the 
eye, but the very limit of experimental methods. This new notion, however, was soon to be 
modified when the foundation of physical science was rewritten by quantum mechanics. 
 
III.  Mid-20th Century Afterwards: Quantumness and More 
Since the turn of the 20th century, physicists have been questing for the “most funda-
mental” building blocks of nature. Particles more elementary than atoms—quarks, leptons, 
gauge bosons, and the Higgs boson—were discovered following stringent standards.16 More-
over, Perrin’s prospect of seeing atoms under the microscope has indeed been realized.17 
Invisibility is thus no longer the distinctive feature of the atomic world.  “Microscopic” objects 
are thereafter not characterized primarily by their spatial scale, but through the physical 
laws they obey: being “microscopic” means their behavior has to be described using the for-
malism of quantum mechanics.  
Different as it may sound from its predecessor, in practice this new criterion requires 
very few objects to be reclassified. For a long time, quantum mechanics has been considered 
the strange theory for atoms, small molecules, and subatomic particles, and therefore, “mi-
croscopic,” “atomic,” and “quantum mechanical” more or less denote the same regime. 
However, this de facto correspondence has no solid basis: nothing in the current version of 
quantum theory forbids it from describing larger objects or more complicated systems. This 
already came into the mind of Erwin Schrödinger as early as 1935, when he raised the “cat 
paradox” trying to present the absurdity of applying the quantum formalism to macroscopic 
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things and living beings.18 This paradox has nevertheless sparked the interest among con-
temporary physicists to study the quantum effects of objects much larger than atoms and 
molecules. A few lines of work have been remarkable: First, several classes of condensed 
matter, e.g. superconductors, superfluids, and Bose–Einstein condensates, manifest the mac-
roscopic accumulation of microscopic quantum effects. 19  Second, quantum transport 
phenomena, such as the quantized conductance and the quantum Hall effect, emerge in high-
quality solid-state samples where the electron coherence length is comparable to the sample 
size.20 Third, certain types of solid-state device, once sufficiently isolated from the environ-
ment, possess a quantized energy-level structure and can be prepared to a state containing 
no more than a few excitation quanta, and even to a coherent superposition of different low-
excitation states.21 Such engineered quantum systems are given the name “artificial atoms.” 
They are the basic components of the quantum machines, whose macroscopic degrees of free-
dom for control and measurement are intrinsically quantum mechanical.22 Those systems 
containing a large number of particles and thus “macroscopic” in spatial scale but exhibiting 
quantum coherence lie in the scope of mesoscopic physics, in which the “macro–micro” bor-
derline is separated from the “classical–quantum” boundary.23 In these cases, the breakdown 
of the one-to-one correspondence between “atomic” and “quantum mechanical” forces us to 
rethink the essence of the old two-world dichotomy.  
Why does there have to be a dichotomy? In fact, more than a century ago, Perrin al-
ready conceived the merge of the two methods of inquiry. What we have been searching for 
is a universal set of basic principles, a consistent way of perception, that is applicable to all 
physical systems regardless of their spatial size or particle number. We are halfway toward 
this goal: On the one hand, the grand success of quantum mechanics grants us the confidence 
that the theory may also work at a larger scale. On the other hand, no one has ever found a 
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“Schrödinger’s cat,” namely, an everyday object in a quantum superposition of classical states 
that are macroscopically distinct.24 Further explorations in mesoscopic physics might provide 
more insightful solutions to this dilemma. 
 
Conclusion 
After sketching a few key episodes in the history of physics, we find the conception of 
the “macroscopic” and “microscopic” worlds is by no means constant over time. Instead, it has 
been actively reflecting our limit of experimentation, perception, and comprehension regard-
ing the composition and behavior of matter. Besides the development in theory and 
philosophy, the evolution of instrumentation plays an essential role in this odyssey. Interest-
ingly, the reality of atomic hypothesis was verified through the study of the Brownian motion 
of granules under the microscope, and the operation of a quantum machine is based on the 
precise control and measurement of natural or artificial atoms. This three-stage relay is em-
blematic of the scientists’ growing capability of observing and manipulating the subtle 
structures of nature throughout the ages.  
In this historical review, two points deserve extra attention: the function of the meas-
urement apparatus, which connects the “microscopic” objects to our “macroscopic” experience, 
and the role of the experimenter, who eventually assigns meanings to everything being ob-
served. Meditations in this direction will recall a series of open questions, like the quantum 
measurement problem25 and the influence of psychology on scientific research.26 Some of 
them are recently evoked by the emergence of mesoscopic physics and quantum machines, 
where the line between atoms and machines is blurred, and the distance between the exper-
imenter and the quantum world is greatly reduced. A good way to conclude this essay is to 
revisit Percy Bridgman’s opinions back in 1958:  
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. . . the object of knowledge and the instrument of knowledge cannot legitimately be 
separated, but must be taken together as one whole. . . . there is no such thing as a 
microscopic domain which is “revealed” to us by the microscope, but that there is ra-
ther an altered macroscopic domain, which we have found how to alter by the 
invention of the microscope—an obviously macroscopic instrument. . . . 
Conventional quantum theory distinguishes between object of knowledge and instru-
ment of knowledge. But knowledge itself implies a knower, . . . not only must we hold 
ourselves to an awareness of the microscope, but also to an awareness of ourselves 
using the microscope and giving its results significance. The latter is admittedly dif-
ficult, . . . but I believe we have to find how to do it before we can be satisfied that we 
have achieved even an approach to intellectual mastery.27 
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